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1 Introduction  
In this paper, we present interdisciplinary work of linguists and literary scholars on 
the emergence of implicatures in fictional, here particularly lyrical texts.1 By system-
atically analysing a small corpus of poems by Emily Dickinson, John Donne, and 
other poets not discussed here, we show that, due to specific characteristics of the 
text type, an additional effect of pragmatic interpretation occurs that we call apparent 
flouting: in poetry, the pragmatic interpretation of the text is achieved in a more 
complex way than in non-fictional discourse. It requires a speech act operator that is 
different from Assert (Krifka 1995), which applies to the text as a whole and does not 
assert its actual truth. Because the pragmatic interpretation of poetry is more com-
plex, cases of ambiguity that put forward several possible readings, for example, are 
not resolved right away. Rather, all possible readings contribute to the overall mean-
ing of the poem: 
(1) The Owner passed – identified –  
And carried Me away  
(Emily Dickinson, “My Life had stood,” 754; Johnson 1976)2 
In (1), for example, the predicate “carry away” can be interpreted both literally, 
meaning that the owner relocated the speaker, and figuratively, such that the owner 
overwhelms the speaker emotionally. Because of the specific communicative situa-
tion of poetry, where the speaker and the reader do not share a common ground of 
information, and because of the specific nature of poetry that does not necessarily 
want to assert something that is true in the evaluation world, both the literal and the 
figurative meaning are kept up as possibilities. On the level of the text as a whole, 
we can observe that both meanings are actually necessary for an overall interpreta-
tion of the poem. We assume that, in general, pragmatic mechanisms, such as pre-
                                                          
1 While “fiction” in the English language often refers to only prose texts (cf. OED “fiction, n.” 
4.a.), we include both poetry and drama in our discussion of fictional texts, which we consid-
er texts that are not true in the actual world but in a set of possible worlds. See Bauer & Beck 
(2014).  
2 All excerpts from Emily Dickinson’s poetry are cited from Thomas H. Johnson’s 1976 edi-
tion. The numbering – J + number – refers to the chronological order of her poems as de-
termined by Johnson; in the following, we will only give Johnson’s numbering. 
2 
supposition resolution and pronoun assignment, arise and are processed as usual 
once the specific characteristics of the text type are taken into account by the read-
er. Apparent flouting presents a pragmatic effect that arises because of the particu-
lar pragmatic interpretation in poetry. We consider the Cooperative Principle put 
forward by Grice to be still valid. When the poet produces an underdetermined or 
ambiguous text, she is not – contrary to first impression – uncooperative. Instead, 
she deliberately exploits context-sensitive phenomena and other elements of the 
text in order to arrive at an enriched and complex meaning of the text. 
Our basic claim for the present work is therefore that fictional, here specifically 
lyrical, texts are not a different form of language per se, but that their specific con-
text integration contributes to the rise of apparent flouting.  
In the following, we will consider Grice’s theory of conversational maxims as a 
theoretical starting point (1975). We then show the need for the speech act operator 
FictionalAssert (Bauer & Beck 2014). By assuming that fiction comes along with a 
speech act operator that guides its interpretation, pragmatic mechanisms can work 
as usual, albeit on another level. The operator FictionalAssert is the missing link 
between the status of fictional texts and the stable workings and rules of grammar, 
including pragmatic mechanisms.  
The framework we propose is the result of a thorough corpus analysis of a small 
set of lyrical texts by Emily Dickinson, John Donne and George Herbert and other 
poets not discussed here. We annotated the poems with software designed for this 
purpose (AnnotAID) and included annotations of (apparent) violations of the maxims 
of conversation. We then analysed these examples systematically and identified 
cases of apparent flouting. 
With the exemplary analyses given here, we hope to show that the pragmatic ef-
fect apparent flouting, found in fictional discourse, is stable across maxims. It is a 
recurring, systematic mechanism that enriches our understanding of the relation 
between text type and pragmatics. Adding to the recent literature on implicature that 
focuses on the fact that implicatures can arise locally below the level of the text 
(Chierchia et al. 2012), we provide evidence that pragmatic mechanisms can also 
be global in their impact in the sense that they can and will apply on the level of the 
text as a whole. This is, we argue, a question of text type. 
The structure of our paper is as follows: We will first give an overview of our 
basic theoretical assumptions and then discuss three examples in detail. In the con-
clusion, we will focus on the consequences of our analyses for the theory of prag-
matics in general and specifically for cases of fictional discourse that involves non-
literal communication.  
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Starting Point: Grice (1975) 
In this paper, we combine Grice’s (1975) notion of implicatures as a result of obey-
ing or flouting the four conversational maxims (see below) with a formal pragmatic 
understanding as to how and when sentences or texts are added as information to 
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the Common Ground (cf. Stalnaker 1978). We assume that implicatures arise at the 
point where the context update is performed, i.e. when information of the sentence 
or text is added to the Common Ground. They do so when the assertion of the sen-
tence is clear, yet the information provided does not fit the context properly, e.g. by 
not presenting novel information or not being relevant to the conversation. The 
speaker has to obey the following principles, according to Grice, to make a state-
ment that is a suitable contribution to a conversation: 
(2) The four conversational maxims: 
a. Manner: “Be perspicuous” 
b. Quantity: Do not give more or less information than is required 
c. Quality: Do not say something which you believe to be false or for which 
you lack adequate evidence 
d. Relation: “Be relevant”  
 (cf. Grice 1975: 45-47)  
In his 1975 publication, Grice proposes that there are four ways of failing to fulfil the 
maxims: 
(3) a. A participant may violate a maxim and thereby be liable to mislead (i.e. not 
to be cooperative). 
b. A participant may opt out, e.g. by explicitly stating that s/he is unable to say 
more. 
c. A participant may be confronted with a clash, e.g. when trying to be as in-
formative as possible (quantity) and not having the necessary evidence 
(quality). 
d. A participant may flout a maxim to create a conversational implicature. 
 (cf. Grice 1975: 49) 
The fourth possibility, namely the participant’s flouting of a maxim, is the alternative 
that will concern us in the following. According to Grice (1975), when a participant 
flouts a maxim, this “characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature” 
(1975: 49). In accordance with (3), the following diagram shows a simplified version 









Fig. 1: Grice’s theory of pragmatic reasoning  
Yes: uncooperative speaker No: cooperative speaker 
Violation? 
Maxim is not obeyed 
Yes: implicature  
Flouting? 
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When a maxim is not obeyed, two strategies could be at play: either, the speaker 
violates the maxim and is thus uncooperative or the speaker does not violate the 
maxim and is cooperative. In the latter case, the maxim is flouted and an implicature 
arises. 
To give evidence for his theory, Grice provides several examples. We will briefly 
consider examples of flouting of those maxims that will be relevant for the two 
literary examples discussed later. 
Grice lists various submaxims under the supermaxim of manner:  
a. “Avoid obscurity of expression. 
b. Avoid ambiguity. 
c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
d. Be orderly.” 
(Grice 1975: 46) 
An example given by Grice to illustrate flouting of the third submaxim helps us un-
derstand how manner implicatures arise. Compare the remarks: 
(4) “Miss X sang ‘Home sweet home.’ 
(5) Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score 
of ‘Home sweet home’.” 
(Grice 1975: 55) 
Here, (5) does not obey the third submaxim of manner, because the utterance is 
unnecessarily excessive. However, the speaker of (5) is not uncooperative. Rather, 
s/he is flouting the maxim in order to convey something different: s/he wants to 
implicate that Miss X’s performance was very bad, but s/he does not want to be 
impolite. This implicature comes about by changing only the representation of the 
informational content. Through this change, the literal meaning of the sentence in (4) 
triggers the implicated meaning.  
Another example Grice provides to illustrate what he means by flouting the max-
im of relevance is given below:  
(6) “At a genteel tea party, A says Mrs. X is an old bag. There is a moment of ap-
palled silence, and then B says The weather has been quite delightful this 
summer, hasn’t it?” 
(Grice 1975: 54) 
Here, B’s answer is, on the surface, not related to the utterance of A at all. Thus, the 
maxim of relevance is not obeyed. However, B still seems to be cooperative. For 
reasons of politeness (maybe Mrs. X is just standing right behind A), s/he quickly 
changes the topic altogether. Accordingly, the statement by B itself is not relevant, 
but only the implicature that B does not want to discuss the topic out of politeness. 
Here, the implicature arises in a different way than in the example above: whereas 
before, the literal meaning of the utterance gave rise to the implicature, here, the 
literal meaning of the utterance is not important at all. The only relevant aspect that 
gives rise to the implicature here is that B changes the topic.  
However, Grice also includes examples taken from literary texts. Grice 
comments neither on the fact that these examples are taken from literary texts nor 
on their fictional nature, but treats the examples in the same way as everyday 
5 
utterances. He uses phenomena like irony, metaphors, tautologies, and other 
stylistic devices found not only in everyday conversation but also in literary texts as 
examples of flouting the conversational maxims. 
For instance, Grice discusses ambiguity by referring to William Blake’s poem 
“Never pain to tell thy love,” quoting it in the variant reading “Never seek to tell thy 
love, Love that never told can be” (Grice 1975: 54). He claims that “thy love” is 
ambiguous between the object of the emotion and the state of emotion, and that 
“love that never told can be” is ambiguous between “love that cannot be told” and 
“love that if told cannot continue to exist.” He calls this the first type of ambiguity,3 
which is used to flout the manner maxim. It is characterised by the fact that “neither 
interpretation is notably more sophisticated, less standard, more recondite or more 
far-fetched than the other” (Grice 1975: 54). However, Grice also states that the 
poet is not explicitly saying one or the other, but rather “conveying” or “suggesting” 
both (Grice 1975: 54). The implicature resulting from this type of ambiguity is, 
according to Grice, precisely the fact that the poet wants to convey both meanings 
at once. 
We believe that Grice’s intuition about this example is correct. Yet, it seems to 
be the case that a few steps are missing that could accurately explain why the effect 
Grice identifies comes about. Specifically, Grice ignores the fact that the utterance is 
made in a fictional framework and takes it as an everyday utterance instead. 
According to him, the pragmatic process triggered by the utterance is to be treated 
as in any other utterance: the listener assumes that the speaker deliberately flouts 
the maxim of manner and makes an implicature. In our opinion, the process involved 
is more complex since in fictional texts we cannot assume the pragmatic step Assert 
(according to Krifka 1995) to take place but rather the pragmatic step 
FictionalAssert, which yields a different result. 
2.2 The Speech Act Operator FictionalAssert 
We assume that the pragmatic interpretation of poetry works differently from the 
pragmatic interpretation of everyday conversation. Pragmatic meaning is formed at 
the level of text in poetry and mediated through the speech act operator Fic-
tionalAssert. This operator can be seen as a counterpart of other speech act opera-
tors that update the context with the assertions made, e.g. Assert (cf. Krifka 1995): 
(7) [[Assert]] = λP.P(@) (simplified version) 
In a non-fictional utterance, it is usually the speaker’s aim to convince the hearer 
that the text/utterance is true in the actual world. This requires a pragmatic step up-
dating the context with the assertion achieved through, for example, the operator 
Assert. It is asserted that the actual world is part of the set of possible worlds in 
which the text is true (see (8)): 
(8) @ ∈ [[ Text ]] 
                                                          
3 Since we only resort to these examples for the sake of illustration, we will not analyse what 
Grice calls the second type of ambiguity here. According to Grice, this type is one where 
“one interpretation is notably less straightforward than another” (1975: 54). As in the first 
case, however, an implicature arises and Grice believes that the author flouts the maxim of 
manner, again.  
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Fictional texts, by contrast, are not usually claims about the actual world. In fact, the 
implicature arises that the actual world is not part of the meaning of the fictional text, 
see (9): 
(9) @ ∉ [[ Text ]] 
However, readers do not perceive fictional texts as lacking meaning or relevance for 
the actual world altogether. Thus, there has to be a connection between the actual 
world and the possible worlds described by each fictional text. We assume that the 
pragmatics of fictional texts derive from a conditional: worlds in which everything the 
text says is the case are worlds that stand in relation R to the actual world, and this 
variable R is to be determined on the basis of the specific text. The nature of the 
relation to the real world is what makes the text relevant. It represents an inference: 
if everything the text says is the case, then this relates to me, the reader, in the way 
specified by R.  
(10) [[FictionalAssert]] = λT. ∀w [ T(w) & w is maximally similar to @ otherwise → 
R(@)(w)] 
At the point in interpretation when the pragmatic step, represented by speech act 
operators like Assert, happens, implicatures may arise. In fictional texts, therefore, 
we expect that implicatures can arise when we apply FictionalAssert. Crucially, in 
fiction, the pragmatic step that updates the context with assertive content happens 
after the whole text (especially in poetry), or rather large units of text (such as para-
graphs in the case of novels or passages and scenes in dramatic texts), have been 
read. This is due to the fact that FictionalAssert does not directly contribute to the 
truth of the text but rather, through the relation R, invites the reader to find out in 
what way the text is relevant for him/her. However, the reader can only find values 
for R after having gathered all of the information given in the text that might inform 
his/her decision about the nature of R. 
Consider the example below: 
(11) “The Crow and the Pitcher 
 A Crow perishing with thirst saw a pitcher, and hoping to find water, flew 
to it with delight. When he reached it, he discovered to his grief that it 
contained so little water that he could not possibly get at it. He tried eve-
rything he could think of to reach the water, but all his efforts were in 
vain. At last he collected as many stones as he could carry and dropped 
them one by one with his beak into the pitcher, until he brought the water 
within his reach and thus saved his life. – Necessity is the mother of in-
vention.” 
 (Aesop 2012) 
Applying FictionalAssert to the fable as a whole results in the text meaning below 
(see (12)). The relation R is formalised in (13): 
(12) “∀w[ [[T]] (w) & w is maximally similar to @ otherwise → counterpart (croww) 
(reader@) & ∀w’[ what is desirable in @ is the case in w’ → reader@ behaves 
in w’ like croww behaves in w]]]”  
(Bauer & Beck 2014: 265) 
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(13) “wR@ iff w is exactly like @ except the counterpart of the crow c in w is the 
human reader h in @ and what is desirable for h in @ in terms of ingenuity 
and persistence is the case for c in w”  
(Bauer & Beck 2014: 263) 
The relation R is parallel to the accessibility relation assumed for counterfactual 
conditionals (cf. Kratzer 1991; Hacquard 2012), such that the text-worlds and the 
actual world are maximally similar except for certain relevant facts that differentiate 
them. Those facts are stated in the text. At the same time these ‘exceptions’ present 
values that are arguments for a function f that takes values of the text-worlds and 
maps them to parallel items in the actual world. The function f is automatically trig-
gered through the relation R. It is a mapping construed by the reader. For example: 
(14) f(the crow) = the reader 
(15) f(die of thirst) = face a seemingly insurmountable problem 
2.3 Apparent Flouting 
Apparently flouting a maxim means that it only seems as if a maxim is being flouted 
on the surface, while on a deeper level we observe that the maxims are being fol-
lowed. One phenomenon closely connected to the emergence of apparent flouting is 
ambiguity: on a local level, an ambiguous statement might seem to be a violation of 
the maxim of manner as only one of the available readings should be available. 
However, both readings evoked by the ambiguity are relevant for the interpretation 
of the text. A meta-reflection is triggered concerning the interpretation of the text.  
In order to explain the emergence of apparent flouting in more detail, our start-
ing point will be to explain the difference between non-fictional occurrences of ambi-
guity and occurrences of ambiguity in lyrical texts that give rise to apparent flouting. 
Then we will depart from the phenomenon ambiguity and, in our discussion of the 
examples below, demonstrate that apparent flouting also arises with other means. 
First, consider the example of a standard syntactic ambiguity below: 
(16) Do you see the man with the binoculars? 
This classic example of syntactic ambiguity can have two readings: one where the 
man himself has binoculars and the other where the addressee of the question is 
asked to look for the man with the help of binoculars. In a conversation, usually 
enough information is provided by the Common Ground such that hearers of this 
sentence can disambiguate quite easily, e.g. because it is clear where the bino-
culars are or because the addressee can ask the speaker.  
However, ambiguity can also be used to flout a Gricean maxim on non-fictional 
discourse, for example the maxim of quantity. Although Grice himself only talked 
about literary examples of ambiguity, as we have seen before, the following dialogue 
demonstrates a clear case of flouting: 
(17) A manager tells a friend about her business meeting with a client. Both know 
that her client has to wear thick glasses.  
Friend: How did it go? Did he sign the contract? 
Manager: Well, his short-sightedness made it pretty hard.  
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In (17), the manager is disobeying the maxim of manner as she is ambigu-
ous about what she means by “short-sightedness”. However, she is still cooperative. 
She implicates that her client had trouble signing the contract not only because of 
his eye sight, but also because, in a figurative sense, he was reluctant to see the 
long-term advantages of the contract. Here, the ambiguity gives rise to the implica-
ture that both the literal and the figurative meaning are relevant for the conversation. 
In that way, the manager proves to be witty. Here, both readings of “short-
sightedness” make the utterance true and the implicated, figurative meaning can 
also be added to the Common Ground through Assert. Thus, according to the dia-
gram in Fig. 1, the maxim is flouted in order to give rise to an implicature, namely 
that both the literal and the figurative meaning can be added as true statements. In 
fictional texts, we do not operate with Assert but with FictionalAssert, and therefore 
expect that ambiguity in fictional discourse often gives rise to apparent flouting, 
where the maxim only seems to be violated at first sight. Instead, a more complex 
interpretation of the text was intended all along where both readings are part of the 
overall text meaning. In the following, we consider examples from lyrical texts where 
maxims seem to be disobeyed, e.g. underspecified or ambiguous text passages. We 
exclude the possibility that these are cases of uncooperative speakers, i.e. simply 
violations of the maxims. It would be odd to assume that the poet would deliberately 
not want to communicate with the reader. But if the poet is cooperative, then s/he 
might flout the maxims – similar to the reviewer of Miss X’s performance or the 
manager. This is more plausible because the poet must intend interpretive effects to 
arise from the properties of the text. We will, however, go one step further: we will 
suggest that the flouting is only apparent. At a local (sentence) level, a maxim may 
appear to be disobeyed. But at the level of the interpretation of the text, it is in fact 
obeyed. For example, both readings of an ambiguous passage are in fact intended 
to be present (like Grice anticipated above). Thus, the relevant maxim only appears 
to be flouted. To the diagram in Fig. 2 we add the second option that a speaker may 












Fig. 2: Grice’s theory of pragmatic reasoning (extended) 
Because FictionalAssert operates on the global level of text and is more complex in 
that it wants to establish a relation to the evaluation world, all readings of elliptical or 
syntactically ambiguous sentences are important to establish R. Thus, unlike in non-
Maxim is not obeyed 
Yes: uncooperative speaker No: cooperative speaker 
Violation? 
Yes: implicature  
Flouting? 
No: more complex interpretation 
of the text as a whole through 
FictionalAssert 
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fictional discourse, where an utterance wants to contribute something truthful and 
thus disambiguating is necessary, here, a more complex text interpretation is neces-
sary. 
An important point about the following examples is that, for reasons of simplicity, 
we only focus on individual lines or parts of poems. Generally though, we assume 
that the pragmatic step is always applied to the poem as a whole: in addition to the 
detailed analyses of the examples to come, much more material would originally be 
part of what we take to be the text meaning. Every sentence of the poem along with 
its different readings would then contribute to the overall text meaning.  
3 Examples  
3.1 Apparent Flouting of the Maxim of Manner 
In the following, we will look at an underspecified (to the effect of its being ambigu-
ous) passage in Emily Dickinson’s poem “This was a Poet” (J448) as an example to 
clarify what we mean by apparently flouting the maxim of manner:  
(18) Of Portion – so unconscious – 
The Robbing – could not harm – 
 (Emily Dickinson, “This was a Poet,” J448) 
The ambiguity that is predominant in the text is between the two options of either the 
reader or the poet being the active agent throughout the poem. On the surface, we 
observe an ambiguity (flouting of the maxim of manner) in the line “The Robbing 
could not harm” that adds to this overall ambiguity. It is not clear who the agent and 
patient of robbing or harming are, respectively. The two possible meanings of (18) 
(simplified versions) are given in (19) and (20) as they would be asserted at this 
point. The respective paraphrases are in (19)b and (20)b: 
(19) a. λw.∃e[robbing(e)(the_readersw)(poetw)(w)]&¬∃e’[BECOME(harmed(e’) 
 (the_readersw)(w))& CAUSE(e)(e’)(w)]  
b. ‘The robbing of the readers by the poet does not harm the readers.’ 
(20) a. λw.∃e[robbing(e)(poetw)(the_readersw)(w)]&¬∃e’[BECOME(harmed(e’) 
 (the_poetw)(w))& CAUSE(e)(e’)(w)] 
b. ‘The robbing of the poet by the readers does not harm the poet.’ 
However, we are not dealing with an ambiguity that is meant to be resolved at this 
point so that the reader would arrive at one interpretation that is to be asserted. 
Since the above example is taken from a fictional text, nothing is intended to be as-
serted at this point. Accordingly, no implicature that results from flouting the maxim 
of manner through this ambiguity arises at the level of assertion either. Instead, both 
meanings are to remain active options and are passed on as possible parts of the 
text meaning. They end up playing a crucial role at the level of text when the opera-
tor FictionalAssert comes into play.  
The first possibility (option A) of textual meaning for (18) is the following: for the 
ambiguity in (18) that results in the possible readings in (19) and (20), we assume 
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that both are part of the text meaning. This is derived through the conjunction of the 
two possible meanings in (19) and (20): both are true simultaneously. However, the 
point is not only to say that both are true (as in the first type of ambiguity Grice dis-
cusses). Rather, a process of reflection on the relation between these two interpreta-
tions and their respective status is triggered that mirrors the complexity of the rela-
tionship reader–poet. This reflection process is part of applying FictionalAssert to 
the text meaning (we are ignoring for a moment that other propositions are part of 
the meaning of the text and take the intersection of (19) and (20) to be the text 
meaning).  
(21) [[FictionalAssert]] ((19)&(20)) = ∀w [(19)&(20) (w) & w is maximally similar to 
@ otherwise → R (@)(w)] 
In order to specify R, we assume that the mapping function f is triggered, which 
maps the poet and the readers within the poem to poets in general and readers of 
poetry in general: 
(22) ∀w [(19)&(20) (w) & w is maximally similar to @ otherwise → counterpart 
(the_poetw) (poet@) & counterpart (the_readersw) (readers@) & counterpart (re-
lationship (the_poetw) (the_readersw)) (relationship (poet@) (readers@))] 
(23) ‘If everything the poem says is the case, then poetry and this poem in particu-
lar create a creative and reciprocal relation between readers and the poet.’ 
The reflection process is triggered by the fact that the reader has to establish what 
the relation R to the actual world has to look like in order for both readings – the 
reader by robbing the poet cannot harm him and the poet by robbing the readers 
cannot harm them – to be true. One possibility is to arrive at a meaning where in the 
actual world there is some kind of reciprocal relationship between poet and reader. 
Both of them ‘lose’ something by writing or reading a poem but both are also left 
unharmed (so no actual loss is involved). The details of what R has to look like are 
established by the individual reader. Most importantly, the ambiguity observed local-
ly vanishes on a global level because both possibilities coexist. Thus, there is no 
ambiguity on the level of the whole text and, in accordance with Grice’s theory, no 
implicature arises. The relevance of both meanings for the actual world is mediated 
through the FictionalAssert operator. The fact that both are true is important for the 
way R is defined. If we were to assert in the usual way, the ambiguity above would 
count as actual flouting of the maxim of manner as found in the example in (17). 
Since we apply FictionalAssert instead (at the level of text), the two ambiguities are 
passed along as parts of the meaning of the text and play a role in finding the rela-
tion R, and no maxim is flouted. We can thus see that the poet strictly obeys the 
maxims on the level of text. 
3.2 Apparent Flouting of the Maxim of Quality 
As illustrated in example (24), the combination of the predicate “stand in corners” 
with the subject “my life” is undefined because “my life” violates the selectional re-
striction that the argument for “stand in corners” must be a physical object: 
(24) My Life had stood – a Loaded Gun – 
In Corners – till a Day  
(Emily Dickinson, “My Life had Stood a Loaded Gun,” J754) 
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(25) a. [[stand]] = [λe.λx.λy: y is a physical object that has a vertical dimension. y is 
in location x in e and y is vertically oriented in e] 
b. [[stand]]([[my life]]) is undefined. 
Thus, the speaker disobeys the maxim of quality, as she utters something that is not 
interpretable. However, we deem the speaker to still be cooperative. As a result, we 
can attempt to reinterpret the mismatch in (25). However, the text makes available 
two ways of reinterpretation that are equally plausible:  
First, to simplify matters, we will assume that the NP “my life” is reinterpreted to 
metonymically refer to the speaker: 
(26) ‘I (the speaker) stand in corners.’ 
Second, (26) can have two possible meanings, since the apposition of the sentence 
“a loaded gun” can either literally mean that the speaker is a loaded gun, or meta-
phorically that she compares herself to a loaded gun but is human. We will assume 
a naïve view of the meaning of the first sentence such that reinterpretation leads to 
two readings that are incompatible (given our world knowledge in the actual world) 
and we will further pretend for now that the text consists only of the first sentence of 
the poem: 
(27) ‘I am a gun and I stand in corners.’  
(28) ‘I am human and I stand in corners.’ 
It is obvious that the speaker cannot be a gun and a human being at the same time. 
We thus see that avoiding a violation of the maxim of quality opens up yet another 
seeming violation of the maxim of manner: by first uttering something uninterpreta-
ble that requires reinterpretation, the speaker is ambiguous in which way this rein-
terpretation can be resolved. The reader thus has to deal with a contradiction that 
comes about through ambiguity. As we have seen in the diagram in Fig. 2, the read-
er has three options: first, s/he could deem the speaker to be uncooperative and quit 
reading the poem; second, s/he could decide for one of the two readings and go on 
reading the rest of the poem with this one reading in mind; or third, s/he acknowl-
edges that the speaker is still cooperative and wants to convey additional infor-
mation through the interaction of both readings. While for the analysis of our lyrical 
examples we have excluded the first option in general, the second option of disam-
biguation will run into problems as soon as the reader goes on reading: the following 
lines and stanzas make it impossible to decide for one of the two readings, as they 
refer to specific characteristics of either human beings or guns.4 That leaves us with 
option three: the speaker is cooperative and wants to communicate something that 
arises through the interaction of the readings. There are two generally accessible 
ways to combine (27) and (28): conjunction or disjunction. We already have seen in 
the discussion of the example in (18) how conjunction works: conjunction takes two 
propositions and states that both have to be true in the same world. This option is 
not available in the present case, as the conjunction of both readings results in a 
contradiction. Here, the speaker is stated to be human and a gun within the same 
                                                          
4 See Bauer et al. (2015) for a detailed analysis and Bauer & Brockmann (accepted) for a 
parallel example. 
12 
world. According to our world knowledge, this is impossible.5 The only other option 
to combine both readings is to combine them via disjunction: 
(29) λw: the speaker is human in w & the speaker stands in corners in w ˅ λw’: the 
speaker is a gun in w’ & the speaker stands in corners in w’ 
Through the disjunction of the two readings, we arrive at an overall meaning that 
states that the speaker is either human or a gun. No contradiction arises. The reader 
can apply the pragmatic step via FictionalAssert without a failure of the composi-
tional interpretation. Instead, the disjunction makes an even stronger claim than a 
conjunction of the readings would. This is possible because FictionalAssert is mod-
elled in parallel to a conditional. Consider (30) and (31) first, which are examples of 
a conjunction and a disjunction, respectively, under an ordinary conditional first:  
(30) a. If Peter and Mary come, Jane is happy. 
b. ∀w[ the same facts are true in w and @ & Peter and Mary come in w → 
Jane is happy in w]  
(31) a. If Peter or Mary comes, Jane is happy. 
b. ∀w[ the same facts are true in w and @ & Peter comes in w or Mary comes 
in w → Jane is happy in w]  
In the scenario in (31), there are more possible worlds that make the statement true 
than there are possible worlds that make (30) true, as illustrated in the Venn dia-
grams below: if we assume that propositions are sets of possible worlds for which 
the statement is true, then, in the case of a conjunction, Jane is only happy in those 
worlds in which both the statement that Peter comes and the statement that Mary 
comes are true (see Fig. 3). In the case of a disjunction, Jane is happy in all the 











        {w’’: Jane is happy in w’’} 
Fig. 3: Venn diagram 1 
  
                                                          
5 Because the poem talks about worlds that are not necessarily the actual world, this could 
be possible in worlds where individuals can change from being human to being a gun. How-
ever, the rest of the poem does not support such a reading as possible. 
{w: Peter  
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{w’: 
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comes 











        {w’’: Jane is happy in w’’} 
Fig. 4: Venn diagram 2 
Coming back to the example in (24), if we treat the two readings in (27) and (28) as 
disjuncts parallel to Fig. 4, this results in a stronger statement once we apply Fic-
tionalAssert: all worlds in which the speaker is either human or a gun stand in rela-
tion R to the actual world. Interestingly, the disjunction also promotes a more com-
plex interpretation that takes into account the similarities between gun and human 
being, as both readings must be equally relevant for finding a value for R. In other 
words, both the speaker being human and the speaker being a gun constitute to-
gether why and how this text is relevant for the reader: 
(32) ∀w[ [[(29)]] (w) & w is maximally to @ otherwise → counterpart (gunw or hu-
manw) (reader@) ] 
The similarities between the two readings could lie in the characteristics that human 
beings and guns share: being dangerous, or depending on somebody else, or being 
used by somebody, for instance. It follows that even if the two text meanings are 
contradictory, FictionalAssert can still be applied and no implicatures arise on the 
global level of text. This comes about through the context update that is specific to 
fictional texts and that takes into account the text as a whole information unit. Thus, 
on the global level of the text, what seemed to be a violation of the manner maxim 
contributes necessarily to the overall meaning of the text. The disjunction of the two 
readings reveals a twofold metaphor: if we assume a human speaker, she uses the 
gun metaphor to express her feelings. But the gun itself is then endowed with hu-
man sentiments and thoughts, and thus acquires characteristics of a human being. 
In this way, the gun is a metaphor to express the state and feelings of a human 
speaker; in addition, the gun leads the way to a second metaphoric level, where it is 
personified. The structure of this twofold metaphor is one of exchange, where a hu-
man being becomes a gun and speaks through the gun, and at the same time a gun 
becomes animate and human, and speaks with a human voice. This makes explicit 
the characteristics shared by human beings and guns. Consequently, on the global 
level of text, the manner maxim is not flouted and no implicature arises. 
3.3 Apparent Flouting of the Maxim of Relevance 
The third example is a case of apparently flouting the maxim of relevance. In the 
poem below, the speaker describes an intense experience that is not specified in 
detail: 
 
{w: Peter  
comes  






(33) He fumbles at your Soul  
 As Players at the Keys  
 Before they drop full Music on – 
He stuns you by degrees – 
Prepares your brittle Nature  
For the Ethereal Blow  
By fainter Hammers – further heard – 
Then nearer – Then so slow  
Your Breath has time to straighten –  
Your Brain – to bubble Cool – 
Deals – One – imperial – Thunderbolt – 
That scalps your naked Soul – 
When Winds take Forests in their Paws – 
The Universe – is still – 
  (Emily Dickinson, “He fumbles at your Soul,” J315) 
Structurally, the poem consists of 14 lines of which the last two are set apart by 
blank space. Although there is no consistent rhyme scheme (which Dickinson’s po-
etry rarely employs), the form recalls the sonnet tradition. While lines 1-12 are about 
a certain action of an unnamed “he” towards an addressee “you” – whose soul is 
sometimes the subject of the action – and the impact of that action, lines 13-14 in-
volve neither “he” nor “you.” Instead, the last lines are a general statement about 
winds and forests which describe something that can maybe best be explained by 
the natural phenomenon of a storm. This sudden change from referential statements 
to general statements and from emotional experience to natural phenomenon might 
seem to violate the maxim of relevance: the last two lines not only introduce a new 
topic that does not seem to have anything to do with the preceding lines, but also 
neglect characterising the two main referents “he” and “you” further. Relevance 
seems not to be observed and thus the last two lines of this poem are a candidate 
for a flouting of the relevance maxim. In a situation such as (6), where a drastic 
change of topic occurred for politeness reasons, hearers would have to find extra-
linguistic reasons for this change in topic. These reasons can be derived through the 
immediate context in which the sentence is uttered, for example the unexpected 
presence of the individual that has just been spoken about badly. In our poetic case 
here, however, we as readers do not have such contextual knowledge at our dis-
posal and thus cannot explain the meaning of the last lines in such a way. But as the 
following discussion will reveal, we do not need to have access to such a context. 
By applying FictionalAssert on the global level of the text, we will show that it is pos-
sible to establish a connection between the first and the last part of the poem, and 
see the contribution of the last lines as relevant and even necessary for the interpre-
tation of the text as a whole.  
As mentioned above, the poem alludes to the structure of a sonnet. In the Eng-
lish sonnet tradition, the final two lines appear in the form of a rhyming couplet and 
are set off from the preceding three quatrains; their function is to comment on, 
summarise, or conclude the poem. In “He fumbles at your Soul,” we find this struc-
ture recalled. Superficially, the last two lines do not relate to the rest of the poem at 
all: the switch from the description of what happens between “he” and “you” (and 
“your Soul”) to what appears to be a general, abstract statement not tied to either 
referent previously mentioned seems puzzling unless we keep the sonnet form in 
mind. Here, the concluding lines of the poem coincide with the poem’s volta, “the 
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‘turn’ that introduces into the poem a possibility for transformation” (Levin 2001: 
xxxix). They summarise the preceding action using the image of a storm. 
To demonstrate how we arrive at this relation between what the previous twelve 
lines say and the description of a storm in the last two lines, we turn to a semantic 
analysis of lines 13 and 14. Here, on a literal level of text, we would not be able to 
get at a meaningful interpretation due to the selectional restrictions of the individual 
elements of the sentence: 
(34) When Winds take Forests in their Paws – the Universe – is still – 
(35) [[ winds ]] = λx. x are winds.6 
(36) [[ paws ]] = λx: x is a proper subpart of animal anatomy. x are paws.  
The semantics of paws (as given in (36)) and the semantics of winds (as given in 
(35)) cannot be combined with winds being the subjects that take something in their 
paws, as a compositional interpretation will result in the violation of the selectional 
restrictions of paws. However, we as readers do not reject this sentence as uninter-
pretable. As before, we assume that the speaker is cooperative and intends to 
communicate something by this mismatched subject-predicate pair. By reinterpreta-
tion, we can resolve the selectional mismatch. One way would be to assign a mean-
ing to winds where they are personalized as an animal-type being. But that does not 
fit well with the object of the ‘taking in the paws’-event, namely the forests. Accord-
ingly, we would have to reinterpret forests as well. This version thus does not seem 
plausible and we will reject it. We will reinterpret the predicate “take in the Paws” 
instead metaphorically in a way that preserves the roughness of the event: 
(37) [[ take in the paws]] = λx. λy. x shakes y in a rough manner. 
(38) [[ take in the paws]] (forests) (winds) = winds shake forests in a rough manner. 
Applying the action of shaking something in a rough manner to the subject and ob-
ject of the sentence results in the meaning given in (38). This ‘shaking’-event can be 
seen as a description of a storm, in which strong winds violently shake the trees in a 
forest.  
Going back to the first twelve lines of the poem, we begin to realize that the ac-
tion of some “he” towards the “you” is described in terms taken from the same se-
mantic field as the storm in the last two lines: “fumbling” at the beginning describes 
the same way of rough handling that the predicate “take in the paws” does. Similarly, 
the “ethereal blow” and the “imperial thunderbolt” are also ways to describe a thun-
derstorm. Thus, the action acted out by the “he” towards the “you” is to be seen in 
analogy to the action acted out by “winds” towards “forests.” Both the first part and 
the last part of the poem describe actions that refer to one and the same action in 
the reader’s evaluation world, using different imagery. The storm that is described in 
the last lines as a sensuous experience seems to be a metaphorical or inner storm 
within the soul of the addressee in the first part of the poem. This inner storm cannot 
be observed from the outside, but takes place within the addressee; similarly, a uni-
verse may be still while storms are raging on, as it is not affected by them. This cor-
respondence between the macrocosm on the level of the universe and the micro-
cosm on the level of the addressee and his/her soul indicates the purpose of the 
closing two lines. They conclude the poem by giving a concise parallel image of nat-
                                                          
6 This is a simplified version of how to capture mass nouns and plural morphology. 
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ural phenomena that can best capture the complex nature of the relationship be-
tween the “he” and the “you” in the first part of the poem. Volta-like, they transform 
one image into another. Thus, different from Grice’s treatment of relevance viola-
tions where the statements themselves are not relevant for the context, here, the 
seeming violation of relevance points us towards how the two lines are relevant for 
the overall text meaning. Thus, the literal level of the two lines activates the imagery 
of a storm retroactively in the previous lines as well. Once again, the speaker is 
maximally informative on the global level of text. 
When applying the pragmatic step FictionalAssert, the reader will have to find 
values for “he” and “you” in his/her own evaluation world, given that those two are 
individuals whose relationship may be described as the rough shaking of forests by 
winds. Possible referents would thus be a hierarchically superior individual for “he” 
that has a strong impact on the addressee – who could be identified as the reader 
him-/herself. Referents for the superior “he” could be God, or a partner in an une-
qual relationship. For demonstration purposes, a very simple-minded and inexhaus-
tive example of a value for R could look like this: 
(39) ∀w[ [[(33)]] (w) & w is maximally to @ otherwise → counterpart (hew) (God@) & 
counterpart (addw) (reader@) & (impact (hew)(addw)) ≈ storm & counterpart 
(impact (hew)(addw)) (impact (God@)(reader@))] 
(40) ‘Worlds in which the relationship between a certain (male) individual and the 
addressee is described as having the same strong impact as a storm, where 
the winds shake forests roughly, stand in relation R to the evaluation world, 
such that God/a superior partner has an equally strong impact on the reader.’ 
Though this paraphrase remains very schematic and leaves out a more exhaustive 
and detailed analysis, we can see that the maxim of relevance, which appeared to 
be flouted before, is being observed on a global level of text, and that establishing 
the relevance of the last two lines is necessary for the overall interpretation of the 
poem. The poem’s form contributes to finding a connection between the first part of 
the poem and the last two lines and our knowledge of genre and different types of 
poetry helps inform this relation. Once again it is necessary to take into account the 
text type. By considering every statement given in the poem as a contribution to the 
overall meaning of the text, it becomes clear how the last two lines are relevant to 
the overall text interpretation instead of communicating something completely differ-
ent from the literal meaning, as was the case with Grice’s example for flouting of the 
relevance maxim. Thus, once again we see that the speaker is cooperative in the 
last two lines of the poem and no maxim is being flouted. 
3.4 Overview of Further Examples 
In the following poems, apparent flouting emerges as discussed above. Detailed 
analyses are provided in the corresponding references: 
(41) a. “To pile like thunder” (Emily Dickinson, J1247): Apparent Flouting of the 
Maxim of Quality (see a detailed analysis of the poem in Bauer et al. 2010) 
b.  “I’m Nobody” (Emily Dickinson, J288): Apparent Flouting of the Maxim of 
Quality (see a detailed analysis of the poem in Bauer et al. (accepted)) 
c. “The Canonization” (John Donne): Apparent Flouting of the Maxim of Man-
ner (see an analysis in Bauer et al. 2013) 
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3.5 Summary 
Using the three examples analysed in depth and the examples that were not dis-
cussed because of lack of space, we have demonstrated that apparent flouting is a 
mechanism that is used systematically as a tool to arrive at a complex text interpre-
tation. This mechanism can be found across maxims (see our examples and the 
examples listed in (41)), even though apparent flouting of manner and quality may 
be more frequent. Apparent flouting also enriches our understanding of the relation 
between text type and pragmatics in that it provides theoretical arguments for a 
global impact of pragmatic mechanisms on the level of text. This has to be seen as 
an addition to the recent literature on implicature, which focuses on the fact that im-
plicatures can arise locally, below the level of the text (Chierchia et al. 2012). The 
relevant factor for the availability for local versus global interpretation processes is 
text type. 
Together with the speech act operator FictionalAssert which operates on a 
global level of text, pragmatic mechanisms apply as usual in fictional discourse. 
However, the specific nature of fictional discourse, which requires a more complex 
speech act operator, gives rise to the additional, until now unobserved mechanism 
of apparent flouting. 
Our analysis indicates that it is not fictionality per se that triggers apparent flout-
ing but rather the effect of a specific speech act operator that captures fictional as-
sertion on the text level rather than the local sentence level.  
Additionally, we have seen that the relation R plays a specific role within Fic-
tionalAssert and thus also for apparent flouting: first, the relation R establishes the 
relevance of the text for the actual world; second, it determines how the different 
readings of the text interact with each other. It is through R that what seems to be a 
violation or implicature on the sentential level can be considered cooperative on a 
global level of text. Furthermore, R reveals that all available readings of a text are 
equally important for an overall interpretation of the text. Further research on a more 
specific analysis of R will follow. 
4 Conclusion  
To summarise: even though Grice’s assumptions about implicatures are correct, 
they have to be refined in fictional texts in order to account for the specific context 
update and the complexity of the text meaning itself. In our investigation of poetry, 
we have found a necessary addition to Grice’s theory, which is able to explain cases 
of apparent flouting. As can be seen from the diagram repeated below, the present 
paper brought to light a yet unobserved possibility to deal with what, on the surface, 
looks like flouting: we see that, in poetry, what seems to be flouting is in fact a literal 















Fig. 5: Grice’s theory of pragmatic reasoning (extended) 
In general, implicatures potentially arise at that point of interpretation where the 
reader has to apply the pragmatic step – which is updating the context with the in-
formation received. In poetry, this happens at a later point than is usually assumed. 
As soon as the reader is aware that the text s/he is presented with is fiction, s/he 
uses a different pragmatic operator than ordinary assertion to make the pragmatic 
step: s/he applies FictionalAssert. Because of the more complex nature of Fic-
tionalAssert that requires the reader to find values for R within the text, ambiguities 
and ellipses are not resolved directly – rather, all possible readings have to be taken 
as part of the overall text meaning. As we have seen in the examples above, read-
ings can either be combined via conjunction or disjunction. The relation R inherent in 
FictionalAssert furthermore triggers a reflection process about the relation between 
the different readings and demonstrates that a global interpretation of text not only 
tolerates the existence of several readings, but demands it in that the interaction 
between the readings constitutes the overall text meaning. We therefore see that the 
same pragmatic mechanisms are at play in fictional discourse. On the pragmatic 
level in particular, we find that fictional texts serve as a valuable data source for nat-
ural language use that demonstrates the whole spectrum of possible uses, rather 
than being an exception that has to be interpreted separately from other uses of 
language. Also, this paper highlights that speech act operators like FictionalAssert 
make up elementary parts of pragmatic interpretations of texts. It remains to be fur-
ther investigated which other speech act operators are generally at play, which re-
strictions guide their use and what kind of information units they update the context 
with. 
  
Yes: uncooperative speaker No: cooperative speaker 
Violation? 
Yes: implicature  
Flouting? 
Maxim is not obeyed 
No: more complex interpretation 
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